St. John's Law Review
Volume 44, January 1970, Number 3

Article 19

CPLR 3101(d): Evidence Gathered by Insurer for Defense of
Insured Is Not "Material Prepared for Litigation" in Separate Action
Against the Insurer
St. John's Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

1970.]

SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

Leave to amend is generally denied where the opposing party
would be prejudiced.9 5 In the instant case the plaintiff, who was
elderly and in ill-health, had prepared her case on the basis of the
general denial. Therefore, the court recognized that to permit the
amendment would clearly be prejudicial. The decision is in accord
with prior case law9" and serves as a good example of the type of
prejudice that would be a basis for a denial of a motion to amend
pleadings.
AxTicLE 31 - DiscLosuRE
CPLR 3101(d): Evidence gathered by insurer in preparation for defense of insured is not "'materialprepared for litigation" in separate
action against the insurer.
The scope of CPLR 3101(d), which grants a conditional privilege
for material created in preparation for litigation, has recently been
narrowed. Collins v. Jamestown Mutual Insurance Co. 97 involved an
action by an injured plaintiff against an insurer. The "insured" had
defaulted in an earlier action brought against him by the plaintiff
after the insurer had disclaimed coverage and refused to defend. The
"insured" then assigned to the plaintiff all rights he might have against
the defendant-insurer. The court compelled the defendant to disclose
any evidence relating to its investigation of the accident. 98 The court
did not have to respond to the insurer's contention that the material
sought was absolutely privileged from disclosure by virtue of an "insurer-insured" relationship since there was no showing that any statements from the insured to the insurer were involved. Moreover, since
this privilege would presumably belong solely to the insured, 9 the
plaintiff might have successfully argned that even if such statements
were involved, any privilege attaching to them was impliedly waived
905
See, e.g., Ciccone v. Glenwood Holding Corp., 44 Misc. 2d 273, 253 N.Y.S.2d 576

(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Kings County 1964) (defendant's motion to amend answer to allege plaintiff was an employee denied because plaintiff's right to workmen's compensation, his sole
remedy as an "employee," was barred by statute of limitations).
90 See Winslow v. Bellaire, Inc., 232 N.Y.S.2d 295 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1962); Kamen
v. State, 34 Misc. 2d 380, 228 N.YS.2d 749 (Ct. Cl. 1962). Cf. De Fabio v. Nadier Rental
Service, Inc., 27 App. Div. 2d 931, 278 N.Y.S.2d 723 (2d Dep't 1967) holding that where a
party who wishes to amend has or should have knowledge of facts at the time of original

pleading, and does not amend for a long period of time, his motion will be denied because of gross laches.
O7 32 App. Div. 2d 725, 300 N.Y.S2d 391 (3d Dep't 1969).
98 It can be assumed that these materials, under normal circumstances, would be considered "materials prepared for litigation." See Kandel v. Tocher, 22 App. Div. 2d 513,
256 N.Y.S.2d 898 (Ist Dep't 1965).
99 Cf. W. RicsAmsoN, EVmIENC, § 434 (J. Prince 9th ed. 1964).
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when the insured assigned his rights under the policy. Thus, it is still
unsettled in New York whether any such absolute "insurer-insured"
privilege does in fact exist. 10 0
The court then considered the availability of a conditional privilege under CPLR 3101(d). The court found none, stating that "an
investigation conducted to defend an insured against a possible legal
u0'
action is not material prepared for legal action as against the insurer."
The third department's interpretation is not without basis. In
Bennett v. Troy Record Co.,10 2 the court required an insurer to disclose materials prepared for prior litigations which involved accidents
similar in nature to that in which the plaintiff was injured. 03 And in
Colbert v. Home Indemnity Co., 10 4 the supreme court held that a
defendant-insurer could not prevent disclosure of materials which it
had gathered for a separate action against its plaintiff-insured.
The holding in the instant case is particularly sound because the
insurer disclaimed coverage in the action against its insured. How could
the insurer thereafter logically assert that the materials it possessed
were prepared for the defense of that litigation?
CPLR 3117(a)(3): Use of party's own deposition denied.
A party may not put his own deposition in evidence unless the con-

10
ditions of CPLR 3117(a)(3) are fulfilled. 1 5 In Jobse v. Connolly,

6

the court did not allow the plaintiff's deposition to be put in evidence
where he had been missing for six years and his attorney had not been
able to locate him. Judge Younger remarked that there is an implied
condition in CPLR 3117(a)(3) that the deponent's absence must not
be due to the act or neglect of the party offering the deposition. Since
the plaintiff's unavailability was a consequence of his own actions, a
100 The question of whether an absolute privilege should attach to an insured-insurer
relationship was raised in Kandel v. Tocher, 22 App. Div. 2d 513, 515, 256 N.Y.S.2d 898,
901-02 (Ist Dep't 1965). 3 WK&M
3101.50b (1969) suggests that an absolute privilege
should not be extended to an insurer-insured relationship and that adequate protection
is afforded to the insurer by the conditional privilege.
101 32 App. Div. 2d 725-26, 300 N.Y.S2d 392 (3d Dep't 1969) (emphasis added).
10225 App. Div. 2d 799, 269 N.Y.S.2d 213 (Sd Dep't 1966); see also 3 WK&M
3101.51
(1969):
[Mjn a suit by the insured against his insurer for failure to settle a case,
material prepared for related litigation is treated as if not prepared for the
case at bar. [Footnotes omitted.]
10 Cf. Linton v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 25 App. Div. 2d 834, 269 N.Y.S.2d 490 (3d Dep't
1966) (construing N.Y. Pub. Serv. Law § 47 (McKinney 1965)).
104 45 Misc. 2d 1098, 259 N.Y.S.2d 36 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1965), af'd mem., 25
App. Div. 2d 1080, 265 N.Y.S.2d 893 (4th Dep't 1965).
105 3 WK&M
3117.04 (1969). See also 7B MCKINNEY'$ CPLR 3117, supp. commentary
119, 120 (1965).
106 60 Misc. 2d 69, 302 N.Y.S.2d 35 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Bronx County 1969).

